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Although there were some positive viewpoints from international press and academia 
that the Republic of Korea (hereafter South Korea) successfully controlled the Middle East 
Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) outbreak in 2015, the domestic point of view towards the 
MERS response in South Korea was critical. As people in the world’s 11th largest economy, 
South Koreans criticized the failure of hospitals’ initial response to the MERS index case 
and the lack of a proper control strategy for secondary and tertiary cases. To contain the 
MERS outbreak, South Korea implemented mainly three MERS control and intervention 
strategies: quarantine and isolation system, temporary closure of schools and cancelation 
of public events, and share of correct knowledge of MERS from trustworthy authorities, 
such as central and local governments and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The 
traveler tracking system, the health care delivery system, and the Infectious Disease 
Prevention Act should be strengthened or amended. The establishment of bioethics and 
adherence to the World Health Organization (WHO)'s guidelines are also recommended to 
prevent possible future outbreak. 
Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS), caused by 
MERS coronavirus (CoV), is a severe acute respiratory ill-
ness with symptoms of fever, cough, and shortness of 
breath. 1 Countries in or near the Arabian Peninsula are the 
origins of MERS, and the first MERS case was reported in 
Saudi Arabia in September 2012. 2 In 2015, a total of 17 
countries outside of the Arabian Peninsula were infected 
with MERS through travelers, and among them, the Repub-
lic of Korea (hereafter South Korea) was the country where 
the most severe MERS outbreak occurred. 2 
The objective of this study is to analyze the MERS epi-
demic in South Korea in a critical view: 1) how MERS ini-
tially imported in South Korea; 2) how the index case spread 
the virus and what the consequences were; 3) what kinds of 
interventions were implemented to control MERS; 4) what 
lessons we learned from the MERS outbreak; and 5) what in-
terventions would be recommended to control a future dis-
ease outbreak. 
SEARCH STRATEGY 
A non-systematic narrative literature review was done 
through four databases (PubMed, Medline, Scopus, Web of 
Science). Additionally, relevant information from Korea 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (KCDC), Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), World Health Or-
ganization (WHO), Google Scholar, and online newspapers 
were manually identified. The searching strategy was as fol-
lows: 
MERS OUTBREAK IN SOUTH KOREA 
The diagnostic pathway to MERS-CoV infection requires 
laboratory diagnosis through a real time reverse transcrip-
tase PCR (rRT-PCT) or serological tests 3-4 at a tertiary gen-
eral hospital, either with a referral slip from a primary or 
secondary hospital or through emergency medical services. 
However, detecting MERS patients in a timely manner is 
challenging because symptoms of MERS-CoV infection are 
non-specific and the spectrum of illness caused by MERS-
CoV is not firmly defined, which requires clinical judgement 
from healthcare providers. 5 Thus, it is essential for hospi-
tals to strengthen biosafety and infection prevention/con-
trol procedures, such as enhancing early detection and 
prompt triage and isolating patients through strict safety 
control policies, to efficiently stop transmission of MERS-
CoV. 5-6 The 2015 MERS outbreak in South Korea began 
with a single 68-year-old patient (the index case) who often 
traveled to the Middle East for his greenhouse building 
business. 7 However, none of the first three hospitals diag-
nosed him with MERS until he visited fourth medical facil-
ity for two times, the Samsung Medical Center, to treat his 
illness. 7 During this 10-day period, he ended up contacting 
742 people and transmitting MERS-CoV to 28 individuals. 7 
Failure to detect the index case early caused devastating 
results. A total of 186 MERS-CoV cases, including 39 
deaths, were reported in South Korea 8, 9, and the case fatal-
ity rate was 20.97% (39 deaths / 186 cases). The total num-
ber of quarantined individuals was 16,752 10, and the MERS 
outbreak caused the loss of US$ 18 billion in gross domestic 
product (GDP), equivalent to 1.31% of the annual average 
1. PubMed: “Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coron-
avirus”[Mesh] AND “Republic of Korea”[Mesh] AND 
(“2015/05/01”[PDAT]: “2017/12/31”[PDAT]) (Results: 
57 in PubMed) 
2. Medline: 1. "Republic of Korea "/ or Korea /, 2. Limit 
1 to yr= “2015 – Current”, 3. Middle East Respiratory 
Syndrome Coronavirus/, 4. 1 and 2 and 3 (Results: 70) 
3. Scopus: (TITLE-ABS-KEY (mers) AND TITLE-ABS-
KEY (korea)) AND PUBYEAR > 2014 (Results: 221) 
4. Web of Science: TOPIC: (mers) AND TOPIC: (korea) 
Timespan: 2015-2017. (Results: 184) 
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GDP. 11 To facilitate laboratory testing for MERS molecular 
diagnosis during the outbreak, the Korean Society for Lab-
oratory Medicine (KSLM) launched a MERS response task 
force. 4 Nevertheless, residents of South Korea criticized the 
government and hospitals harshly, saying that they failed to 
detect the index case and conduct an initial epidemiologic 
investigation as expeditiously as possible. 
MERS CONTROL AND INTERVENTION STRATEGIES 
To contain the MERS outbreak, three approaches from cen-
tral and local governments, non-government organizations 
(NGOs), and schools were mainly implemented as follows: 
1. QUARANTINE AND ISOLATION SYSTEM 
Historically, quarantine has been the cornerstone of a co-
ordinated disease-control strategy to stop spreading infec-
tious diseases, from the Black Death and plague to cholera 
to influenza. 12 To control the MERS outbreak, the South 
Korean government decided to put 16,752 people into quar-
antine and authorize a law with up to two-year sentences 
in prison or fines of up to US$ 18,000 for violating quar-
antine. 10, 13 However, quarantine has always been a con-
troversial strategy because it raises ethical, political, and 
socioeconomic issues, requiring a careful balance between 
public concerns and individual civil rights. 12 Quarantined 
people for MERS in South Korea had persistently high levels 
of anxiety and anger, even four to six months after the re-
moval of isolation due to the lack of mental health support. 
14 Voluntary quarantine at home or in an isolated area was 
also strongly recommended for those who were exposed to 
the disease. 15 
2. CLOSING SCHOOLS TEMPORARILY AND CANCELING PUBLIC 
EVENTS 
Although there was no exact data to count the total number 
of closed schools, it is estimated that more than 2,400 
schools, including 22 universities canceled classes to pro-
tect students from the MERS outbreak. 16, 17 A joint South 
Korean-WHO mission said that it was unnecessary to put 
students in their homes because MERS was hospital-asso-
ciated and schools were not linked to the transmission of 
the virus. 17 When the school boards of Seoul and Gyeong-
gi province announced the extension of school closures, the 
mission recommended reopening schools. 17 Many public 
events, such as music or film festivals, agricultural events, 
and international book fairs, were canceled or postponed. 
18 Despite the WHO’s skepticism, it was obvious that tem-
porary school closure and canceled public events prevented 
any possibility of the disease spreading outside of hospitals. 
3. SHARING CORRECT KNOWLEDGE FROM TRUSTWORTHY 
AUTHORITIES 
One online study of the risk perception of university stu-
dents during the epidemic says that only half (53.5%) of 
them had the essential knowledge about MERS, and trust in 
mass media was positively associated with overreaction. 19 
Central and local governments and NGOs tried to provide 
the correct knowledge about the disease outbreak so that 
people would not overreact due to mass media. NGOs in 
South Korea have tough competition to receive public mon-
ey. 20 Since NGOs were greatly involved in disaster man-
agement, the government supported NGO’s education and 
training program for staff and volunteers who are frontrun-
ners in the field. 21 Also, establishing NGO networks to dis-
seminate and exchange disaster management information 
was important to avoid previous mistakes. Although social 
media, such as Facebook, Google+, and Twitter, would be a 
good platform that could enhance the public’s response and 
accelerate the detection of a disease outbreak, it could al-
so disseminate inaccurate information causing exaggerat-
ed concerns and social panic. 19, 22 It was not timely, but 
the provision of appropriate and correct public health infor-
mation from central and local governments, and NGOs was 
the key to have people gain the risk perception without un-
necessary fear and have compliance with self-quarantine at 
home. 
LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
THE FUTURE OUTBREAK 
From the MERS outbreak in South Korea, it is important to 
learn the lessons to prevent any future outbreak. A total of 
five recommendations is listed as follows: 
1. TRAVELER TRACKING SYSTEM VIA INFORMATION AND 
COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY (ICT) 
There was no system to keep track of travelers’ movements 
outside of the country and to have a close contact line 
among airports, medical facilities, and KCDC. KCDC should 
have promoted MERS awareness thoroughly for those who 
traveled to the Middle East region. South Korea’s ICT sector, 
the highest valued-added among Organization for Econom-
ic Cooperation and Development (OECD) nations 23, could 
potentially solve this disconnected communication loop. 
The leading telecom company, KT, introduced the system 
to keep track of travelers’ moving routes through the big 
data, location data, and roaming data from 7.3 billion mo-
bile phones to prevent the global spread of infectious dis-
ease in real time at the United Nations (UN) Global Compact 
Leaders Summit 2016. 24 Once this system is set up, there is 
no need to rely on travelers’ unclear retrospective memory, 
and the airports and medical facilities will be able to organ-
ically share any of the possible pathogen carriers. 
2. STRENGTHENING THE HEALTH CARE DELIVERY SYSTEM 
Almost all MERS cases (183 out of 186 cases) were from 
nosocomial infection, both intra-hospital infection and 
hospital-to-hospital transmission because South Korean 
medical facilities’ patient rooms and emergency rooms 
were very crowded (7, 25). In addition, hospitals had to com-
pensate the lack of income by having more than half of 
their rooms include 4+ beds per room and reducing pro-
fessional health care providers. 25, 26 In consequence, the 
infection routes turned out to be from the same ward pa-
tients (33.3%), visitors (26.7%), hospital workers (16.1%), 
patients’ families (9.9%), and caretakers (1.8%). 14, 25, 27 Al-
so, MERS-CoV RNA was detected in many different places 
from anterooms, medical devices, and air-ventilating 
equipment as well as environmental objects, such as bed 
sheets, bed rails, IV fluid hangers, and X-ray devices in the 
hospital. 27 A referral management system, from primary/
secondary hospitals to tertiary hospitals, needs improve-
ments to ensure prompt, optimal care at the right time by 
sharing patients’ prescription and medication data among 
hospitals, so that further diagnosis can be effectively made 
at the higher-level hospital. Furthermore, it is important 
to review the current referral policy to the tertiary hospi-
tal and think about the strategy to disperse patients in the 
emergency rooms to respond to the real emergency cases. 
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3. AMENDING THE INFECTIOUS DISEASE PREVENTION ACT 
Hospitals were not professional enough to deal with infec-
tion control. Since there was no obligation to share MERS 
information to the public, the Samsung Medical Center re-
fused to initially share, which exacerbated the outbreak. 
28 The Infectious Disease Prevention Act of 2015 has been 
amended to regulate quarantine measures more effectively: 
1) the government has the legal authority to order medical 
institutions to follow property quarantine measures imme-
diately, and 2) the medical institution’s loss incurred from 
property quarantine enforcement will be financially com-
pensated by the government. 29 Through these amend-
ments, medical institutions will not be slow to respond to or 
evade their responsibility to future disease control. To make 
this Act effective, the risk communication system should 
be established between the government and medical stake-
holders, and the compensation fund should be consolidated 
as a national subsidy for medical institutions that sacrifice 
private interest for the execution of property quarantine 
enforcement. 
4. ESTABLISHING BIOETHICS 
Bioethics is not an established field in South Korea. 30 The 
quarantine was the primary response to the MERS outbreak, 
but it restricted the liberty of individuals; in the future, 
bioethical principles and values – transparency from the 
government and the protection of privacy for those involved 
– should be established. 30 For the response to the next out-
break, ethical considerations, such as the advice from the 
University of Toronto Joint Centre for Bioethics, have to be 
incorporated into the disease control intervention. 30 
5. FOLLOWING WHO’S GUIDELINES 
Between 28 August and 1 September 2017, the WHO’s Joint 
External Evaluation (JEE) assessed South Korea’s capacity 
to prevent, detect, and respond rapidly to the public health 
emergency, aligning with the International Health Regula-
tions (IHR) (2005). 31 South Korea has achieved most of the 
sustainable capacities to manage health threats required 
under the IHR, but there are still opportunities for improve-
ment. The important factors that need to be considered are 
1) the most pressing public health risks should be priori-
tized, 2) the resources to address them should be mapped, 
3) a system for deploying health personnel should be estab-
lished, and 4) risk communication mechanisms should be 
established. 31 
CONCLUSIONS 
The MERS outbreak in South Korea began from a single in-
fected traveler who returned from the Arabian Peninsula. 
South Korea was a defenseless state of spreading MERS, de-
spite the fact that it is one of the most developed countries 
in the world. Although 39 South Koreans died from MERS, 
an intensive quarantine and isolation system, school clo-
sure, and government and NGO’s efforts could stop further 
MERS transmission. These steps along with lessons learned 
from MERS are expected to prevent and control a future dis-
ease outbreak. 
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